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Abstract 
The present report describes human error analysis as emerged from the Three Mile 
Island accident, that was a milestone in the development of studies on human factors; it 
then presents some methods to quantify and analyse the risks related to human error. A 
further case of analysis is examined, focusing on the importance of organizational-
related factors, as the Root causes of operator-error at the sharp end of the accidents 
chain of events. Some of the most relevant managerial/organizational factors are 
discussed, following the classification that G.Drogaris (G.Drogaris 1993) derived from 
his analysis of the MARS database. The classification is then confronted with the 
aspects required by the Seveso II Directive for a Safety Management System. Finally 
the sixth chapter considers the way in which human factors are analyzed in the Safety 
Management System of an Italian Oil Refinery, and possible ways of placement and 
improvements of this process through a particular use of the Success Likelihood Index 
Methodology. 
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Introduction 
 
 “Western civilization places a high value upon rationality, and this civilization is sustained, if 
not dominated, by clusters of organizations, large and small, which profess an intention to 
display this value by pursuing rational courses of action. 
In such a society the occurrence of a disaster indicates that there has been a failure of the 
rational mode of thought and action which is being relied upon to control the world.” 
      (Barry A. Turner 1978) 
Examples of man-made disasters are the accident that occurred in the nuclear facility of 
Chernobyl in 1986, or the leakage of methyl isocianate that occurred in Bhopal in 1984 
resulting in the death of more that 2500 people; or, more recently, the explosion in the 
chemical plant of Toulouse in September 2001. 
The potential destructive capacity of some industrial activities can be compared to that of 
natural cataclysms, but cannot be “regarded as resulting from some external and unfathomable 
force which could not be directly controlled but only accepted”(B.Turner 1978) .  
The responsibility of controlling the potential hazards of a production-related activity is shared 
by the company that performs the activity and the regulatory authority under whose 
jurisdiction the activity is being performed. The consequences of a major accident can affect a 
wide area. It is often necessary to have a cooperative approach both in the industrial sector (the 
Bhopal accident was followed by a period of crisis in the chemical industry) and in the 
regulatory field. This has been the subject of the European Directive EEC/501/82A) which 
defines a ‘Major accident’, as: 
“An occurrence such as a major emission, fire or explosion resulting from uncontrolled 
developments in the course of an industrial activity, leading to a serious danger to man, 
immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and/or to environment, and 
involving one or more dangerous substances”. 
The approval of the Major Accident Hazard Directive took place some years after the Seveso 
Accident and 8 years after the Flixborough accident “which was the spark starting discussion 
about a European common approach to industrial major accidents” (K. Rasmussen 1996). 
The Directive was amended twice in 1987 and 1988 to incorporate lessons from two accidents: 
Bhopal (1984) and Basle (1986). Eventually in 1996 a new Directive (96/82/EC the so called 
Seveso II) was introduced, demanding in addition to previous requirements for  
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2• land use planning and control  to decrease vulnerability of target environment 
• and, safety management systems (SMS) in the industry to decrease hazard from the 
source. 
The need for SMS derived from the analysis carried out through the use of accident data which 
highlight that the root causes of most accidents are due to human and organizational factors. 
The data base MARS (Major accident Reporting System) has been established at the Joint 
Research Center of the European Union in Ispra (Italy), and it contains all the Major Accidents 
notified by the EU Member Countries.  
According to the analysis carried out on the accidents in MARS, management inadequacies 
are a significant causative factor in over 90% of the accident in the European Union since 
1982. In the accident reports for which the root cause was attributed to management factors, a 
human/operator error was stated to be the actual immediate cause. 
This finding confirms results anticipated by B Turner and from subsequent empirical studies 
like those of Trevor Kletz (T.Kletz 2001).  
A safety management system is, according to the definition of the OHSAS 18001 (1999): 
“ part of the overall management system that facilitates the management of the Occupational 
Health and Safety risks associated with the business of the organization. 
This includes the organizational structure, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, 
procedures, processes and resources for developing, implementing, achieving, reviewing and 
maintaining the organization’s Occupational Health and Safety policy”.(OHSAS 18001 1999)  
In the context of the Seveso II Directive the definition of a Safety management system is 
strictly connected with that of safety policy in fact a SMS is the organizational structure, 
responsibilities, procedures and resources for implementing the safety policy (C.Kirchsteiger 
et al 1998) and its are defined as: 
 “(a) the major accident prevention policy should be established in writing and should include 
the operator's overall aims and principles of action with respect to the control of major-
accident-hazards;  
(b) the safety management system should include the part of the general management system 
which includes the organizational structure, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes 
and resources for determining and implementing the major-accident prevention policy;  
(c) the following issues shall be addressed by the safety management system: 
(i) organization and personnel - the roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in the 
management of major hazards at all levels in the organization. The identification of training 
needs of such personnel and the provision of the training so identified. The involvement of 
employees and, where appropriate, subcontractors;  
(ii) identification and evaluation of major hazards - adoption and implementation of 
procedures for systematically identifying major hazards arising from normal and abnormal 
operation and the assessment of their likelihood and severity;  
(iii) operational control - adoption and implementation of procedures and instructions for safe 
operation, including maintenance, of plant, processes, equipment and temporary stoppages;  
(iv) management of change - adoption and implementation of procedures for planning 
modifications to, or the design of new installations, processes or storage facilities;  
3(v) planning for emergencies - adoption and implementation of procedures to identify 
foreseeable emergencies by systematic analysis and to prepare, test and review emergency 
plans to respond to such emergencies;  
(vi) monitoring performance - adoption and implementation of procedures for the ongoing 
assessment of compliance with the objectives set by the operator's major-accident prevention 
policy and safety management system, and the mechanisms for investigation and taking 
corrective action in case of non-compliance. The procedures should cover the operator's 
system for reporting major accidents of near misses, particularly those involving failure of 
protective measures, and their investigation and follow-up on the basis of lessons learnt;  
(vii) audit and review - adoption and implementation of procedures for periodic systematic 
assessment of the major-accident prevention policy and the effectiveness and suitability of the 
safety management system; the documented review of performance of the policy and safety 
management system and its updating by senior management.” 
 
The present report describes human error analysis as emerged from the Three Mile Island 
accident, that was a milestone in the development of studies on human factors; it then presents 
some methods to quantify and analyse the risks related to human error. A further case of 
analysis is examined, focusing on the importance of organizational-related factors, as the Root 
causes of operator-error at the sharp end of the accidents chain of events. Some of the most 
relevant managerial/organizational factors are discussed, following the classification that 
G.Drogaris (G.Drogaris 1993) derived from his analysis of the MARS database. The 
classification is then confronted with the aspects required by the Seveso II Directive for a 
Safety Management System. Finally the sixth chapter considers the way in which human 
factors are analyzed in the Safety Management System of an Italian Oil Refinery, and possible 
ways of placement and improvements of this process through the use of the Success 
Likelihood Index Methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT AND HUMAN 
FACTORS. 
 
“Since the accident in 1979 at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant, the nuclear industry and the 
NCR (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) have become acutely aware of the fact already 
established in many industries, that human error in some form is responsible for a large 
proportion of accidents and is a challenge to system safety and productivity” ( The national 
Academy of Sciences 1988). 
 
The analysis of human factors and their connection with safety management in this paper will 
begin with a practical example: The Three Mile Island Accident. The analysis of this case 
brought great changes in dealing with human performance problems especially in the nuclear 
field. The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations and the National Academy for Nuclear 
Training were established in the years following the accident. The chain of events that lead to 
the occurrence, the improvements and the actions suggested in the investigation of the 
accident on behalf of the President of the United States (Kemeny 1979) covered several 
aspects. However the most crucial were the human related ones. 
. 
1.1 ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION. 
 
On the 28 of March 1979, at about 4:00 am, a choke occurred in a resin polisher unit used to 
filter the secondary water. In order to clean the choke the operators used instrument air. The 
instrument air turned out to be at a lower pressure, and hence water got into the instrument air 
lines. The amount of water supplied to the steam generator drastically diminished and the main 
feed water pumps stopped running. Within seconds the turbine tripped and the reactor 
automatically shut down; the control rods, which absorb neutrons, dropped down into the core 
and stopped the fission chain. The production of heat still continued due to radioactive decay. 
The reactor coolant pumps continued feeding the primary circuit, but no heat could be 
removed by the secondary system. In fact, no addition water could be supplied to the 
secondary system, since the emergency feedwater system had been tested 2 hours before the 
accident and several valves were mistakenly left closed. Only 8 minutes after the beginning of 
the accident, they were discovered closed and reopened  
The primary water then started boiling and a power operated relief valve (PORV) opened, 
allowing the steam to be discharged to the quench tank, while the make-up pumps started 
automatically to replace the water that had evaporated in the primary circuit. After the water 
pressure dropped below the set point for closure, the valve did not act as expected and stuck 
open. The light indicator on the operator panel was activated by the signal given to the valve 
and not by its actual position, so that the operator thought the valve was shut. 
The stuck-open valve caused the pressure to continue to decrease in the system, and some 
voids began to form in the circuit. This resulted in the system water being redistributed in such 
a way that the pressurizer (a tank that controls the pressure) became full of water. This in turn 
allowed the level indicator to point to the operators that the circuit was full of water. They 
therefore shut down the make-up water pumps, preoccupied with avoiding damages due to 
potential excessive vibration. 
Within two or three hours the damage to the reactor occurred: a significant amount of fuel 
melt, and the radioactivity in the reactor coolant increased. After the accident the water in the 
5primary circuit began to carry fuel debris that escaped from the reactor coolant system and 
flowed to the floor beneath the containment. Eventually, the cause of the incident was 
understood and water was added to the reactor cooling system and the reactor was allowed to 
cool down. 
The environmental and radiological consequences of the accident were minor, thanks also to 
the swift emergency response, and no deaths or injuries, or significant levels of contamination 
outside the plant occurred.  
1.1.1 HUMAN AND MANAGEMENT FACTORS ANALYSIS 
Going through the accident description it is clear that if the operators had kept the emergency 
cooling system on in the early phase of the accident, the melt down in the core wouldn’t have 
occurred. So the accident could be labeled as due to ‘operator/human error’. 
But there are other factors that need to be taken into account: 
1) The operators lack of proper training: 
At TMI only two hours per year were dedicated to training for operators on operational 
problems and from experiences at other reactor plants (lessons learned form other 
accidents). 
The training, nevertheless, might have been adequate for the normal operation of the 
plant but it did not provide an understanding of the plant phenomena, which could have 
enabled them to deal with problematic circumstances. In fact, for instance, they were 
not able to recognize the relationship between the temperature and pressure of the 
water in the primary circuit, and to understand it was boiling. The training should 
prepare operators of hazardous activities as problem solvers, since it is not possible to 
“foresee everything that will go wrong and write instructions accordingly” (T. Kletz 
2001). 
In order to convey more experience and well informed diagnosis skills, training should 
have included real simulated emergency situations and up-to date preparation. 
2) The emergency feedwater system, at the start of the chain of events, was unable to 
function. As part of maintenance procedures the feedwater system has to be tested and 
the valves that connects it to the main system has to be closed and then reopened. But 
in this case either because of operator slips of attention and for an administrative lack 
of supervision, the valves were not reopened. The human performance problems 
related to maintenance and work-permit procedures will be discussed in chapter 3. 
3) The emergency response and the safety procedures at the TMI plant, and in many other 
nuclear facilities, were developed mainly with the intention of meeting the requirement 
of the legislation. So as the emergency procedures and design were concentrated on 
major occurrences such as a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) because of a large 
break in the primary system or a LOECC (Loss of Emergency Core Cooling), which do 
not allow time for significant operator intervention, they ignored the possibility of a 
slowly developing small-break accident. The same type of accident has been even 
pointed out in a memorandum written 13 months before the occurrence of TMI, by a 
senior engineer of the Babcock & Wilcox Company (suppliers of the nuclear steam 
system): warning ignored!. 
4) As pointed out by the Report of the President’ Commission (Kemeny 1979), the 
control room, in which the supervision of the operations of the TMI unit 2 plant was 
performed, lacked an ergonomics human-machine interface: 
6- The light indicators of the PORV valve were not connected to the actual 
position of the valve, and this provided false information to the operators, 
leading them to think that the valve was closed while it was stuck open. 
- The control panel was huge, with hundreds of alarms. During the first minutes 
of the accident, more than 100 alarms were sounding, and it was not possible to 
suppress the less important ones in order to let the operators focus on the main 
issues. 
- Some key indicators were placed in unsuitable locations. The operator could 
not even see them, in normal conditions. 
- The information was not presented in a clear and, as much as possible, plain 
form. For instance, even if the pressure and temperature of the reactor coolant 
were shown, there was no indication that the combination of the two meant that 
the water was turning into steam. 
 
Few and relatively inexpensive improvements in the control room could have 
significantly facilitated the management of the accident. Human factors design is a 
vital aspect of safety operation of a Nuclear Power Plant, Since the TMI accident 
existing operational and near-operational power plant control rooms has been revised 
from the human factors standpoint. 
5) Another factor that was found to have some implication was the way the shifts of the 
operators were organized. Long-duty periods or sleep losses reduce the mental and 
physical capacity of even the best-trained operator.  The HSE (5) has recently 
developed a tool for assessing short-term daily fatigue or cumulative fatigue over a 
shift cycle. The tool consists of an index based on five factors (shift start time, shift 
duration, rest periods, breaks and the number of consecutive shifts). In order to avoid 
the effect of fatigue the shifts and the turns should be carefully planned, the use of an 
index to assess their implications is advisable. Furthermore there are strategies, or 
ergonomic devices, that can be used for incrementing operator alertness. These include 
physical activity, light therapy with a high-intensity light box, planned naps etc. The 
safest means is however a wise schedule for the shifts. 
 
This analysis demonstrates that root causes of the accident were to find in a complex of 
factors that were linked to faulty management factors in design, licensing and operation of 
the plant. 
1.2 HUMAN FACTORS TAXONOMY 
1.2.1 THE BASE  
“The health and safety Executive’s Accident prevention advisory unit and others have 
shown that human error is a major contributory cause to 90% of accidents, 70% of which 
could have been prevented by management actions” (“Improving compliance with safety 
procedures” Human Factor Reliability Group) 
If 90% of the causes of accidents are under the same umbrella of “human error” that 
means that under this voice are grouped different aspects and different items. 
The use of a sound classification can be useful to better specify our object of study and 
to direct towards methods of prevention. 
Unfortunately in the field we are approaching there is no universally agreed 
classification system, hence the taxonomy we would like to adopt must be made for our 
7specific purpose: studying how human errors contribute to the industrial framework, as 
part of the organizational failures that lead to major accidents. 
 
Unsafe acts in an accident cause-chain that are mainly responsible for the final outcome 
are rooted in the organizational environment; on this we focus our attention. 
 
A useful starting point is the description of cognitive control mechanism errors made by 
Jens Rasmussen. 
Rasmussen’s model was primarily directed at analysing errors made by those in 
supervisory control of industrial installations, particularly during emergencies in 
hazardous process plants. 
The Skill-rule-knowledge structure is derived from a study conducted on operators 
working on localizing breakdowns throughout electronic devices (Rasmussen &Jensen 
1974). 
 
•Human performance at the skill-based level is characterized by models of well-known 
instructions and those that could be seen as “analogical structures in a space-time 
domain”. 
•The rule-based level is characteristic of performance related to familiar problems, 
whose solutions are rules with an if-then structure. It is part of the training and 
preparation baggage of the operator, formalized usually in procedures. 
•The knowledge-based level is related to new situations, in which a complex interaction 
between the human “bounded rationality”(H.Simon 1956) and the new reality is 
required, without the help of structured and available models or rules.  
In the study developed by Rasmussen there are eight steps in the heuristic proceeding of 
problem solution: 
- activation 
- observation 
- identification 
- interpretation 
- evaluation 
- goal selection 
- procedure selection 
- activation 
These steps, in real decision processes, are not sequential. There are several patterns that 
can be built up with the elements of this list. The general frame for a Knowledge-based 
pattern, for instance, is a rule-based model (whenever it’s possible human tends to recur 
to known rules). 
 
The three main kinds of errors related to these performance levels can be (Reason 1998): 
 
Performance level                                                          Error type 
Skill-based level                                                               slips and lapses 
Rule-based level                                                               RB mistakes 
Knowledge-based level                                                    KB mistakes 
 
- Slips and Lapses are considered a momentary lack of attention. The operator knows 
what to do and how to do it but the task is in any event not carried out. Routine tasks 
are monitored by the lower levels of the brain and are not continually controlled by the 
conscious mind. (Reason and Mycielska 1982). 
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- Rule-based mistakes (RB mistakes) can be defined in relation to the if-then structure. 
It can happen that the diagnosis of the situation is wrong (if clause), even if the 
situation had been foreseen by the procedures or by the human/machine interface. So 
the rule applied is not appropriate or it can happen that even if the diagnosis of the 
situation is right the wrong rule is applied (then clause). 
 
- Knowledge-based mistakes (KB mistakes) are typical of those situations in which the 
person involved in a problem solving condition has no stored problem-solving routines 
to apply. Hence s/he is obliged to try to build up a model for the reality s/he has to 
cope with, referring to his personal knowledge background and his ability to analyse 
problems. 
 
Furthermore slips and lapses generally precede the problem detection while RB and KB 
mistakes occur in the trials that follow the detection of a problem. 
The human mind-control that can be used for each kind of error also differs: As pointed out by 
Rasmussen at the skill-based level “performance is based on feed-forward control and depends 
upon a very flexible and efficient dynamic internal world model”; at the Rule-based level 
“performance is goal-oriented, but structured by the feed-forward control through a stored 
rule. Very often the goal is not even explicitly formulated, but is found implicitly in the 
situation releasing the stored rules….The control evolves by the survival of the fittest rule”. 
The only level at which a feedback control exists is the Knowledge-based level. The action in 
this case is lead by a local goal, every local achievement must be verified and the action must 
be corrected if not appropriate (error-driven methodology). 
 
A further development adopted in our classification is the step highlighted by Reason in his 
book “Human error”: 
“Errors involve two distinct kinds of “straying”: the unwitting deviation of action from 
intention (slips and lapses) and the departure of planned actions from some satisfactory path 
towards a desired goal (mistakes). But this error classification, restricted as it is to individual 
information processing, offers only a partial account of the possible varieties of aberrant 
behaviour. What is missing is a further level of analysis acknowledging that for the most part, 
humans do not plan and execute their actions in isolation, but within a regulated social milieu. 
While errors may be defined in relation to the cognitive processes of the individual, violations 
can only be described with regard to a social context in which behaviour is governed by 
operating procedures, codes of practice, rules and the like. For our purposes, violations can be 
defined as deliberate-but not necessary reprehensible- deviations from those practices deemed 
necessary (by designers, managers and regulatory agencies), to maintain the safe operation of 
a potentially hazardous system… 
…An unsafe act is more than just an error or a violation- it is an error or a violation committed 
in the presence of a potential hazard: some mass (Tokaimura), energy (Chernobyl),or toxicity 
(Bhopal) that, if not properly controlled, could cause injury or damage.”  
The scheme number 1 reproduces Reason’s classification (Reason 1990): 
Scheme 1: Reason classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the book  “An engineer’s view of Human error” (T. Kletz 2001) a better name for violations 
that is to say non-compliance, is proposed, because violations can be seen as errors that occur 
when “someone knows what to do but decides not to do it” and most of the time “the person 
concerned genuinely believes that a departure from the rules, or the usual practice is 
justified”(see the case study of the Tokaimura accident ). 
There is a fifth kind of error that Kletz proposes in his classification: mismatches, that is to 
say “errors that occur because the task is beyond the physical or the mental ability of the 
person asked to do it, often beyond anyone’s ability”. 
Among the  knowledge based mistakes it is worth noting a particular category highlighted by 
J. Reason: the so called “fixation”. This kind of  attitude is  the obstinacy to continue to act 
according to a familiar pattern or a first diagnosis chosen, without considering new aspects of 
the problem or new signs coming from the evolution of the problem under analysis. This is a 
normal human attitude, and the only way to make it less likely to determine bed outcomes is  
to  warned the operators of this possible ”trick” and to provide a very good training using 
simulators. 
UNSAFE  
ACTS 
UNINTENDED 
ACTION 
SLIP
LAPSE
Memory failures 
Omitting planned items 
Place-losing 
Forgetting intentions 
INTENDED 
ACTION 
MISTAKE
Rule-based mistakes 
Misapplication of good rule. 
Application of bad rule 
 
knowledge-based 
mistakes 
Many variable forms. 
VIOLATION
Routine violations 
Exceptional violations 
Acts of sabotage 
Attention failures 
Intrusion 
Omission 
Reversal 
Misordering 
Mistiming
10
 
2 METHODS FOR HUMAN RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 
 
2.1 STARTING IN “MEDIAS RES”. 
 
Human Reliability is defined as “the probability that a human correctly performs an assigned 
task at the specified time, within the specified time duration, and in the specified 
environment”.(LaSala 1998)) 
This definition is very similar to the most widely accepted definition of reliability that is 
mainly used for technical equipment: 
“Reliability is the probability that a system will perform satisfactorily in a specified interval of 
time(t,  t+ ∆t) when used under stated conditions and supposing it was not broken in t ”(Von 
Alven 1965). Reliability is used for not repairable components and it is characterized by the 
failure rate η, η(t)*∆t expresses the probability that the components will have a failure in [t, t+ 
∆t] , if it was in perfect conditions in t.   
In the paper “Mathematical Characterization of Human Reliability for Multi-task system 
operations” by R.E. Giuntini(Giuntini 2000), in fact, the method applied to quantify human 
reliability is analogous to that used for esteeming hardware reliability. 
A Reliability function is a curve that relates the frequency with failures that occur in a time 
period R(t). It can be derived from the probability density function f(t) for errors: 
∫=
=
=
tmt
tt
dttftF
0
)()(     and  )(1)( tFtR −=   Æ  ∫=
=
−=
tmt
tt
dttftR
0
)(1)(  
The probability density function for the error rate of hardware equipment, is normally 
expressed by the Weibull probability distribution: 
 
)/(1)/)(/()( ηβηηβ tettf −−=                                     
where η is the characteristic life and β is the shape or slope parameter.(Abernethy 1983)   
The Weibull probability distribution is used for describing the pattern of the error rate 
illustrated by the ‘bathtub’ curve for hardware reliability analysis. In the paper mentioned 
above the same curve is applied for describing a human error rate. 
The three phases of the curve are: 
1) the learning phase: during this phase the rate at which human errors occur decrease 
with time: “as the operator learns the task, there is less likelihood that errors will occur 
“(Giuntini 2000) 
2) the stabilized error phase: the operator has learned the task and human error rate will 
be constant(same likelihood of occurrence during the phase). 
3) fatigue phase: the error rate increased with time due to operator fatigue, lack of 
motivation, etc. 
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Figure 2.1 Combined error rate curve   
 
This is just one example, it is worth noting that the central part of the assumed bath-tube curve 
is obtained from β=1 which leads to  f(t)= (1/η) e-(t/η),  consequently the human reliability 
assumes the value of R(t)= e-(t/η), that is the typical form of the R-function of a component in 
the stabilized error phase. This model can be mainly applied for modeling the skill-based 
performance level, on the base of this correspondence. 
 
This is just one example of the several models that have been proposed in more than 50 years 
for evaluating human performance reliability. 
There is no unique way of approaching and for evaluating human error, in this report the 
attention will be focused only on two methods: 
• THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) 
• SLIM (Success Likelihood Index Methodology) 
 
Before going further in presenting human reliability assessment methods it is important to 
point out a common problem in the field: the data. 
There are three aspects, in my opinion, that need to be taken into account: 
1) Human errors, that have been presented as slips of action and lapses of memory in the 
previous chapter, are valuable for probability and statistical methods, because they are 
mainly beyond intention; while mistakes and violations are more difficult to evaluate 
because they are due to a certain degree of intention and “People intuitive inferences, 
probability assessment and prediction do not conform to the law of probability theory 
and statistics” as emerged in the study conducted by D. Kahneman, (D. Kahneman et 
al. 1982). 
2) Much of the data available are ‘highly application-specific’ and not transferable tout-
court to other applications,  “it is not sufficient to say that the probability of error in 
reading an instrument is 5x10-3; it is necessary to specify the environmental 
conditions, the characteristics of the instruments, the personnel training 
etc..”(P.Vestrucci 1990). 
3) The data collection presents, at the moment, some other difficulties regarding the 
establishment and the maintenance of a database. “Data repertories have been 
established several times, but some have not been maintained” (K.LaSala 1998). 
In general, human reliability data can be divided into three main categories: 
- data obtained from historical statistics 
- data obtained from laboratory simulations 
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- data obtained from the judgment of experts. 
The data used in the two human reliability assessment methods we are going to analyse 
are: data from historical statistics and laboratory simulations for THERP, and data 
obtained from the judgment of experts for SLIM.  
 
2.2 THERP 
Therp (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) is the most widely used and 
recognised model for human reliability assessment. 
It was developed in 1964 by Swain (A.D. Swain 1964), Its object is ”to predict human 
error probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be 
caused by human errors, alone or in connection with equipment functioning, operational 
procedures, and practices, or other system and human characteristics that influence system 
behaviour” (Swain and Guttman)(A.D. Swain H.E. Guttman 1983). 
In this technique the operator error can be considered as an equipment failure, and the 
main analytical tool is the event tree. 
The event tree is a logic structure that is used for identifying the possible events that can be 
originated from an initial situation. Every limb represents a point of a binary decision (the 
decision can only result to be correct otherwise incorrect, no other possibilities are 
available.). 
The steps to follow in implementing a human reliability analysis using THERP are 
(J.Reason 1990): 
a) identify the system functions that may be influenced by human error 
b) list and analyse the related human operation (dividing the operations in simple 
tasks). 
c) estimate the relevant error probabilities using a combination of expert judgment 
and available data for each task 
d) estimate the effects of human error on the system failure events (integrating 
Human Reliability analysis with the wider Probability Risk Assessment). 
At each limb of the tree (that is to say a task) is associated a specific value of HEP (Human 
Error Probability). There are some databases and tables from which it is possible to take 
the value for a nominal HEP (like in the table reported below that is taken from the 
“Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant 
Applications”(Reason 1990). 
In order to take into account the specific features of each case of analysis, it is necessary to 
modify the value of the nominal HEP by the use of Performance Shaping Factors (PSF). 
According to the judgment of the expert it is possible to choose a value of HEP in a range 
fixed by the upper and lower limits, that are respectively: 
(nominal)HEP x EF 
(nominal)HEP / EF 
Where EF is Error Factor that is a value associated for each given HEP in the tables. The 
HEP is considered to be an average value in an interval where HEP x EF and HEP/ EF are 
the extremes.The HEP is incremented if the conditions are worse than the nominal 
conditions, and it is decremented otherwise. 
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 ITEM   POTENTIAL ERRORS   HEP EF 
Making an error of selection in changing or restoring a locally operated valve when the valve to be 
manipulated is 
(1)    Clearly and unambiguously labelled, set apart from valves                   .001        3 
that are similar in all of the following: size and shape, state, 
and presence of tags 
(2) Clearly and unambiguously labelled, part of a group of two or                       .003        3 
         more valves that are similar in one of the following: size and  
         shape, state, or presence of tags 
(3)    Unclearly or ambiguously labelled, set apart from valves that                  .005        3  
          are similar in all of the following: size and shape, state, or  
          presence of tags 
(4)    Unclearly or ambiguously labelled, part of a group of two or                    .008        3  
        more valves that are similar in one of the following: size and                              
         shape, state, or presence of tags 
(5)    Unclearly or ambiguously labelled, part of a group of two or                      .01          3  
         more valves that are similar in all of the following: size and                                
          shape, state, or presence of tags 
 
 
When at each limb is the associated an HEP value and when the final event of the tree has 
been identified as a success event (S) or a failure event (F), the probability of each 
sequence of events is calculable by multiplying the values of the branches that are part of 
the sequence. 
In the example below there is an event tree, branches labeled with lower case letters 
represent successful performance of an action. Branches labeled with capital letters 
represent failure of the same action. 
            A 
                   a 
 Ps= a⋅ b⋅ c⋅ d                          F4 
 Pe= A +a⋅ B + a⋅ b⋅C+ a⋅ b⋅ c⋅D      b          B 
                                                                                                          F3 
 Pe+Ps+1          c          C       
                                                           F2 
              d               D 
              F1 
  S 
 
where Ps is the probability of success,       
while Pe is the probability of error. 
                                                                                       
It is then possible to complete the analysis considering the possible recovery actions. It 
may be also done only for major sequences of events.  
 An example taken from P.Vestrucci (Vestrucci 1990) is reported in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Example of a THERP error data table (Swain and Guttman 1983) 
Fig 2.4: example of an event tree used in THERP
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                             a            A                                                    
                                                                      
                                                              B                 F2 
                                          b 
                                                       b’             B’ 
 
                               S1            S2                           F1 
 
 
aBb'  ab S2 S1  Ps +=+=  
 
aBB' A   F2F1 Pe +=+=  
 
 
Where 
 +aBb’ is the effect of the recovery action on Ps  
 – aBb’  is the effect of the recovery action on the Pe. 
 
In the calculation the actions are considered independent from each other, this can lead to 
underestimation of the error probability. 
In THERP the dependence is considered only for consequent actions. The dependence can 
be 
-  negative: 
The error in A increases the probability of success in B, in other words  
 
ba|b
BA|B
then
Ba |B
,|
<
<
>
> bAb
 
- positive: 
The success in A increases the probability of success in B. 
bA|b
Ba|B
then
BA |B
,|
<
<
>
> bab
 
 
The degree of dependence can be chosen among five values: 
ZD= Zero dependence 
LD= low dependence 
MD= medium dependence 
HD= high dependence 
CD= complete dependence 
 
 
 
Fig 2.5 example of an event tree with multiple success paths
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ZD    LD     MD                                HD                                                 CD 
⏐     ⏐         ⏐                                     ⏐                                                     ⏐ 
Fig 2.6: Dependency level scale. 
 
For establishing the nature of possible dependencies, the suggestions by Swain and 
Guttman (9) may be useful: 
- It is better to examine the influence of the error or of the success of the precedent 
action on the one that is under examination, without establishing a unique dependence 
level for all the actions of one task; 
- In case of uncertainty is better to use the higher dependence degree; 
- It is important to evaluate the time and space relationship between actions (the 
dependency increases for actions that are close in time and space); 
- Evaluate the functional link between actions, if they are functionally linked the 
dependency is stronger; 
- Stress increases dependency especially in operators with lack of experience or self 
confidence; 
- Consider similarity in the personnel (operators with similar characteristics are more 
keen to interact with each others); 
- In case the situation of analysis is the supervision of one operator by another operator it 
is important to consider the compound probability of error in case it is HEP is around 
10-6, because it is very unlikely for two operator’s actions, to have an HEP < 10-5; 
The following table (table 2.3) illustrates equations for calculating the probability of 
success Ps(“N” ⏐”M”) for the action “N”, considering the success in the previous action 
“M”, where n is the basic probability of success for the action “N”. The second table (table 
2.4) refers to the probability of error Pe(“N” ⏐”M”) for the action “N”, considering the 
failure of the previous action “M”, where N is the basic human error probability ( BHEP) 
for the action “N”. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Dependency levels for success probability evaluation (P. Vestrucci 1990) 
  
 Dependency level     equation 
 
 ZD      Ps(“N” ⏐”M”) = n 
 LD      Ps(“N” ⏐”M”) = (1 +19n) / 20 
 MD      Ps(“N” ⏐”M”) = (1+6n) / 7 
 HD      Ps(“N” ⏐”M”) = (1+n) / 2 
 CD      Ps(“N” ⏐”M”) = 1.0 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Dependency level for error probability (P.Vestrucci 1990) 
  
 Dependency level     equation 
 
 ZD      Pe(“N” ⏐”M”) = N 
 LD      Pe(“N” (”M”) = (1 +19N) / 20 
 MD      Pe(“N” (”M”) = (1+6N) / 7 
 HD      Pe(“N” (”M”) = (1+N) / 2 
 CD      Pe(“N” (”M”) = 1.0 
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2.3 SLIM. 
 
SLIM (Success Likelihood Index Methodology) is a method based on the structured expert 
judgment (Embrey et al. in 1984). This methodology “allows experts to generate models 
that connect error probabilities in a specific situation with the factors that influence the 
probability”(J. Reason 1990). These factors are the Performance Shaping Factors (PSF); 
while in THERP the PSF are used to adapt the situation to the general frames the data are 
referred to, in this case, they are the starting point of the method itself. 
 
 
Following a description of the method (Vestrucci 1990), the steps into which this method 
can be divided are: 
1) Constitution of the group of experts and first approach to the case of analysis. 
2) Definition and selection of the Performance shaping factors for the case of analysis. 
(see table 2.5) 
3) Assignment of weighting factors for each PSF 
4) Scoring of each PSF 
5) Calculation of the success likelihood index 
6) Conversion of the SLI in HEP. 
 
Table 2.5: Examples of performance shaping factors 
 
The PSFS have to be ordered in a list that starts with the most important one. 
Once that the weight wi of the most important PSF is established, the others are fixed 
according to the first (if for instance the first is training and its weight is 100 and the 
second PSF is stress and its weight is 50, that means that the influence of the training is 
two times more important than the one of the stress in performing the task). 
The weights are then normalized (every value is divided by the sum of all of them). 
For each PSF a value ri, is then fixed that represents the specific condition of the case of 
analysis in relation to that feature (if for instance we are evaluating the PSF “knowledge of 
the system” and the case of the analysis present the operator at his first month of 
employment, with very little training and no precedence experience in the field, the ri, 
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would be probably be 0 or in any case very low, depending on the scale (0 ≦ ri≧  100  
etc..). 
An example of the data that can be produced with these two steps is reported in the two 
tables below (table 2.6 and table 2.7).  
Tables 2.6/2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
The success Likelihood index is then calculated with the simple expression: 
∑
=
=
N
1i
  SLI ii rw  
 
Where N is the number of PSFs considered (in the example above, they are 4). 
The index SLI is already a valid instrument for supporting quantitatively a human 
reliability analysis, in connection with the managerial and organizational factors: 
It is in fact, possible to evaluate the effects of modifying the ri values, that mirror also 
organizational aspects, or to analyse the influence of every single PSF. 
The SLI can be also used as a Performance Indicator, in order to monitor aspects of a 
safety management system (as proposed later on in the present report). 
The last step of the method concerns the way by which is possible to obtain the value of Ps 
or Pe from the value of SLI. 
The author of the method proposed two possible ways: 
11 b  SLI a  ln(Ps) +=  
22 b  SLI a  ln(Pe) +=  
 
Where the constant have to be specified, calibrating the equation using some empirical 
data points (like in the example below, figure 2.7).  
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Fig 2.7: Success Likelihood Index and Human Error Probability 
 
The method proposed for the conversion presents various problems, mainly due to its 
arbitrariness. For a further detailed analysis of the problems it is advisable to consult the 
(Vestrucci 1990), which illustrates another possible way of performing the conversion. 
However, within the scope of this report it is not interesting to examine the issue further 
because it will be only used the SLI Index, in order to perform a Human Reliability 
Analysis in our application to a practical case. 
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3.  ANALYSIS OF THE TOKAIMURA ACCIDENT 
 
The Tokaimura nuclear fuel processing plant is operated by JCO Company. In this facility 
uranium is re-processed, and supplied to fuel producers. The facility is one of medium-to-
small-sized chemical plants, emplying 120 people.  
The plant is located 120 KM northeast of Tokyo. Tokaimura is a large village in Ibaraki 
Prefecture, which is also close to the town of Nakamachi. 
There are about 310,000 inhabitants within a 10 Km radius from the plant. 
There are three conversion facilities at this site: 
- one for low enriched uranium (enrichment of less than 5%),annual capacity 220 
tonnes/year; 
- one for low enriched uranium (less than 5%) with an annual capacity of 495 
tonnes/year; 
- one, in which the accident took place, in a conversion building at the western side of 
the site, for enriched uranium. The enriched uranium was processed either for the 
production of uranium oxide (U3O 8) powder from uranium hexafluoride (UF6), or for 
the production of uranium oxide powder from the scrap. 
On the 30th of September 1999 a nuclear flash at the JCO Company’s Tokaimura nuclear plant 
resulted in the deaths of two inexperienced workers. 
The main function of the plant is to convert isotopically enriched Uranium hexafluoride into 
uranium dioxide fuel. This is one step in the process of making reactor fuel rods. 
The uranium used in this process has been enriched to contain up to 5% of the fissile isotope 
235U ( the 238U is relatively inert). 
The JCO plant occasionally purifies uranium to be made into fuel for an experimental fast-
breeder reactor known as Joyo, which requires fuel enriched to 18,8% 235U. 
The enrichment of the fuel to the 18,8% of 235U implied a higher probability of accumulating a 
critical mass that can lead to the triggering a chain reaction. 
The Japan’s Science and Technology Agency (STA) in licensing this nuclear facility in 1980 
established regulations by which a mass limit of 2,4 kg was fixed on the amount of 18,8% 
enriched uranium that could be processed at one time at the JCO plant. 
The procedure needed for purifying the uranium fuel for the Joyo facility licensed by STA 
was: 
- small batches of uranium oxide U3O8 , in powder form, are put into a dissolving tank 
,where it is mixed with nitritic acid to produce uranyl nitrate, UO2(NO3)2 . 
- the uranyl nitrate solution is then transferred to a buffer tank (geometrically shaped in 
order to avoid criticality). The buffer tank attends a mixing function. 
- from the buffer tank the solution is sent into a precipitation tank where is ammonium 
salt solution is added, to form a solid product ammonium diurinate (NH4)UO7 . 
Uranium oxide is extracted from the solid precipitate, and reprocessed in the dissolving 
tanks until the uranium oxide is sufficiently pure. 
Then it is converted to uranyl nitrate, transferred to a storage container, and shipped to 
another facility where it is prepared and made into Joyo fuel. 
 JCO therefore needed to mix some high-purified enriched uranium oxide with nitric acid to 
form uranyl nitrate for shipping. 
When the accident occurred, three technicians, had put about 2,4 Kg of uranium powder into a 
10 litre stainless steel bucket with water and a specialized acid, for the last steps of the 
conversion process. 
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The procedure of homogenization to a uniform consistency was supposed to be controlled 
using a specially shaped narrow storage column tank on a one-batch basis. 
In order to speed up the process, they mixed the oxide and nitric acid in stainless steel bucket 
rather than in the dissolving tank. This new way of operating followed instructions in the JCO 
operating manual which had not received STA approval. After the Licensing process in fact, 
no inspection or periodical audit was performed by the competent authority. 
The chemical in the bucket was moved to a five-liter beaker through a filter and tipped into the 
precipitation tank with a funnel. 
In doing so they skipped the solvent extraction column, the extraction-stripping column and 
the buffer column. 
U3O2
Uranium
powder
Storage
tanks
Controlled
shape
UO2(NO3 )2
Container Precipitation tank
Shipping Draining
Temporary
Baking
furnace
Bucket
HNO3
U3O8
Standard process
Criticality
UO2(NO3)2 (NH4)2U2O2
 
 
 
The total amount of enriched Uranium poured from the bucket directly into the precipitation 
tank was about 16,6 Kg (the precipitation tank was designed for 2,4 Kg of uranium per batch). 
This caused the criticality: 
 At 10:30 a.m. the addition of the seventh bucket caused a self-sustaining chain reaction, the 
technicians saw a blue flash. The two technicians near the vessel began to experience pain, 
waves of nausea, difficulty in breathing, and problems with mobility and coherence.  
The gamma radiation alarms activated immediately.  
The blue flash was a result of the Cherenkov radiation that is emitted when nuclear fission 
ionizes air. 
 
Fig 3.1: Simplified scheme of the process as it should have been and as it was actually followed (critical 
passage from the bucket to the precipitation tank : red arrow)
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OPERATORS FACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES. 
1. The JCO had modified the procedure approved by the Japan’s Science and Technology 
Agency (STA) for processing highly enriched Uranium, in order to speed up the 
production and the workers were following this “unlicensed procedure”. In Japan, 
periodic inspection during operation seems not to be a legal requirement for facilities 
of this type. 
2. On the other hand the competent authority never performed any periodic inspection on 
the facility. 
3. The procedures used were completely different from the one specified for the 
equipment and methods used, and were not approved by the regulatory authorities. 
4. The operation that the workers were performing was not one in the normal 
manufacturing process of uranium fuel for light water reactors but was during the 
process for manufacturing uranium fuels for Joyo. The accident occurred during a 
process in which a special product was manufactured in small quantities. 
 
The worker involved described the reasons for these methods in an interview as reported by 
the Asian Labour Update (Occupational Safety and Health Resource Centre Newsletter 
August 2000): 
a. The accumulation tower was only 10cm above the floor, making it inconvenient to put 
the liquid into the container. Therefore, the remaining liquid in the tower was removed 
using a dipper. The worker thought it was improper to handle the material in this way, 
but the equipment had not been improved. Furthermore they were obliged to handle the 
material in this way because of the unauthorized change in the process made by the 
JCO . 
b. It was common practice to put 16Kg of uranium into the tower, and he thought that it 
would be acceptable to put an equivalent quantity of uranium into the precipitation 
tank, because the tower and the tank had a similar capacity. 
c. He was obliged to work in a remote and strange workplace 
d. Although his supervisor gave him no instructions to accelerate the operation including 
sampling after homogenization, he wanted to complete these operations earlier to allow 
new staff, which were scheduled to join the crew in October 1999, to handle the liquid 
waste process from the outset. 
e. The workers were involved not only in the highly enriched uranium handling 
operation, but also in the low level radioactive waste handling operations, which was a 
quite confusing situation for them. 
 
THE ACCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY: 
The fact that the procedure followed in the company was not the one licensed by the Japanese 
Science and Technology Agency, meant that it was possibly unsafe in itself. This violation 
demonstrates that it is not possible to rely on self responsibility of a company in severe safety 
matter: this could have been prevented if regular inspections in the nuclear facility by the 
authority that had licensed the plant were foreseen. Also regulation was lacking since the only 
inspection foreseen was at the time of commissioning, to ascertain that it was constructed 
according to the licensed design. 
The violation would have been less likely If the facility would have been inspected 
periodically by the competent authority. 
The facility in which the accident occurred was not operating continuously, its cumulative use 
was about 2 months per year. For tasks that are not routine ones particular attention has to be 
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focused, because the ability required for performing these tasks are not skill-based, hence a 
higher probability of errors is likely to be present. 
The performance should be seen as a rule-based one, therefore good training and an 
established written procedure must be followed, and supervised.  
The operators found the equipment unsuitable for the task they were asked to perform. It 
probably required a not very difficult change in the design in order to meet their suggestion. 
It’s possible to improve processes and equipment if the relationship of the management with 
the front line is not the one-way communication type. 
The fact that there was a possible source of confusion in the way the equipment of the process 
was designed (the tower and the tank had a similar capacity), is a sign that it’s possible to 
avoid criticalities adopting a Poka Yoka approach in designing which is normally something 
easy and relatively un-expensive to do. As reported in this example (T. Kletz 2001): In the 
early days of anesthetics an apparatus was used to mix chloroform vapor with air and deliver it 
to the patient. If the apparatus was connected up in the other way round liquid chloroform was 
blown into the patient with results that were usually fatal. The apparatus was redesigned with 
different types of connection or different pipes sizes so that they were no longer 
interchangable. 
The three workers were working in a remote area of the plant; this in turn, could have affected 
the way they perceived themselves and their role in the company. 
The fact that they felt the area as a remote one could be due to a lack of supervision from the 
plant manager, and could  have conveyed the sensation that the process they were performing 
was a not very important one (it was not part of the normal manufacturing process); lowering 
the level of attention, which is strictly connected with the motivation. 
This effect could be avoided directly supervising the area, even only during the everyday 
patrol of the plant manager (particularly when the process at which the area was assigned, was 
being performed). 
The operators were under time pressure because they were waiting for new staff to join the 
crew, and they wanted to enable them to start from the beginning of the process. Being under 
time pressure is one of the environmental conditions that raises error probability; In the 
process industry production should be scheduled considering all the possibilities to avoid time 
tight conditions that could lead to criticality. 
The safety management system that the company had was mainly focused on meeting the legal 
requirements; a safety culture in a high hazard process plant is part of the integrated 
management. It could be built up over time, if the SMS is tailored upon the reality which is 
actually applied and if the management of the company is directly involved and consider the 
problem of the technician that is handling the hazardous substance as part of its own job. 
The daily safety report, that the plant manager was expected to compile, was just seen as a 
bureaucratic-routine in the organization culture, that meant that the form and the attention paid 
to that tool could be changed in order to use it as a proper method of prevention. 
An Audit could be performed monthly, partially based on the result of the daily reports, by the 
manager of the manufacturing department. 
And a weekly safety report meeting, as the one presented in the SMS suggested by the Seveso 
II directive, should be introduced, as a common practice to discuss daily reports and accidents 
that occurred in companies of the same field. Also this directive institutes a regular inspection 
process, also aimed to assess the SMS adequacy. 
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4. CRITICAL FEATURES OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
 
“Human factors dominate the risks to complex installations. Even what appear at first sight to 
be a simple equipment breakdown can usually be traced to some prior human failure. 
The casual sequence of an accident move from fallible decisions, through the intervening 
planes to an accident, that is, the unplanned and uncontrolled release of some destructive 
force, usually in the presence of victims” (J. Reason 1990) 
Human error can be more widely intended as the direct human responsibility in the occurrence 
of one of the elements in the chain of events that lead to an accident. 
This is then not only related to the sharp end (operator’s error) but it can be related to errors of 
the managers at every level of the company, this type of ‘human performance problems’ are 
usually known as organizational/managerial factors. 
In the already mentioned book  “An engineer’s view of human error” by Trevor Kletz, it is 
quoted “Try to change situations, not people” as the main theme of the book itself. 
It is important from an engineering point of view to focus the efforts on the aspects of the 
problem on which it is possible to intervene in order to optimize the general situation. 
The organizational factors are easier to be modified than human nature. Another aspect of the 
problem is the specificity of the hazard that the organization has to cope with. 
The attitude that is generally adopted towards industrial activities is a cost-benefit approach: 
The activity is undertaken if it provides economic benefits that justify and reward the effort of 
undertaking it. 
Risk management is part of these efforts, and has to be carried out in order to avoid losses that 
will overwhelm every reached, promised or foreseeable benefit. 
Risk characterized most human activities, especially those regarding knowledge, as it is 
suggested by the title of one of the Gerling Akademie† publications, “Risiko und Wagnis” 
(Risk and Adventure). Risk is an object by definition, very difficult to handle, thus the related 
organizational activity is called ‘Safety Management’. The process of safety management 
consists of well-defined steps aimed at avoiding losses and identifying opportunities to 
improve security, quality and, as a consequence, performance in an organization. 
Management is a technique, a method, hence its rules have to be adequate to the object that 
has to be managed; the main starting point is the observation of the object itself. 
The circumstances in which the object (Risk) expresses itself in a more striking way are 
accidents. The discussion on some of the most critical features of safety management, as 
emerged in the cases reported in Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), can start from 
the classification derived from G. Drogaris about Root causes of Accident scenarios. 
From this experience he derived the following classification that examines the main 
managerial/organizational critical features of safety management, and underlying or root 
causes of ‘human/operator’ errors in most of the accidents presented before. 
Root causes: 
1) Managerial/organizational omissions 
1.1 Lack of a safety culture 
                                                 
†
 Die Gerling Akademie für Risikoforschung hat sich die Aufgabe gestellt, die verschärfte Risikosituation in der 
industriellen Welt zu erforschen und bewußt zu machen. Sie greift dabei auf interdisziplinäre und ganzheitliche 
Ansätze zurück. Das hieraus gewonne Wissen wird in Form von Publikationen, Beratungen und Seminaren 
Unternehmen zugänglich gemacht. From the web site of Gerling Akademie für Risikoforschung AG, Zürich. 
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1.2 Inadequate safety organization 
1.3 Pre-determined safety procedures not observed (E.g.: to keep up or to speed up the 
production, etc) 
1.4 Insufficient or unclear procedures 
1.4.1 Operational procedures 
1.4.2 Maintenance procedure 
1.4.3 Testing, commissioning, inspection or calibration related procedures 
1.4.4 Construction procedures 
1.4.5 Internal communication procedures 
1.4.6 Work permit procedures 
1.4.7 Laboratory analysis procedures 
1.4.8 Material storage procedures 
1.5 Insufficient supervision 
1.6 Failure to clarify causes of previous accidents 
1.7 Insufficient operatory training 
1.8 Understaffing 
1.9 Other related to design inadequacies (to be attributed whenever causative factors 
2.1/2/3/4 as defined here below are identified among the causes of accident) 
1.10Insufficient installation of safeguarding 
2) Design inadequacy 
2.1 Application of codes/practices not suitable for the process 
2.2 Process inadequately analysed from the safety point of view so that the hazards 
had not been identified 
2.3 Design error (omission, no proper application of codes practices) 
2.4 Failure to apply ergonomic principles to the design of man-machine interface 
2.5 Codes/practices applied provided only for limited protection 
3) Appropriate procedures not followed (short-cuts) 
3.1 Operational procedures 
3.2 Maintenance procedures 
3.3 Testing, commissioning, inspection or calibration procedures 
3.4 Construction procedures 
3.5 Internal communication procedures 
3.6 Work permits 
3.7 Laboratory analysis procedures 
3.8 Material storage procedures 
 
All the above issues could be discussed in more detail, for the scope of the present work we 
will focus the attention on the organizational failure to clarify causes of previous accidents.   
“Accident investigation is like peeling an onion or dismantling a Russian doll. The outer layers 
deal with the immediate technical causes and triggering events, while the inner layers deal 
with ways of avoiding the hazard and with the underlying weaknesses in the management 
system.” (T.Kletz 1993) 
The purpose of reporting and evaluating/investigating accidents has to do whit the core of 
safety management is to prevent further occurrence identifying weak points in a safety 
management system. “The function of safety is to locate and define the operational errors that 
allow accidents to occur. This function can be carried out in two ways: (1) by asking why-
searching for the root causes of accidents, and (2) by asking whether or not certain known 
effective controls are being utilized” (Dan Petersen 1989). Organizations should therefore 
establish effective procedure(s) for dealing with this task, and because the main aim of 
identifying causes and root-causes of accidents is similar to that of detecting causes of near 
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misses and non-conformities. The procedure(s) should be able to handle all of them. Minor 
failures or malfunctions could be indicative of earlier stage of major accident occurrences, 
which is why it is useful to analyse them. 
In the OHSAS 18002 2000 it’s possible to find some guidelines for implementing a process of 
accident, incidents and non-conformances investigation: 
“The procedure should: 
- define the responsibilities of the persons involved in implementing, reporting, 
investigating, follow-up and monitoring that corrective and preventive actions; 
- require that all non-conformances, accidents, incidents and hazards be reported; 
- apply to all personnel (contractors, temporary workers and visitors as well) 
- take into account property damage; 
- ensure that no employee suffers any hardship as a result of reporting a non-
conformance, accident or incident; 
- clearly define the course of action to be taken following non-conformances identified 
in the safety management system”. 
There are two features related to human attitude, that needs to be underlined as influencing 
factors in accident investigation. 
First of all, as already indicated in the OHSAS 18002 2000 suggestions, it is important to 
avoid a blame attitude in the company. 
A study conducted by D.A. Hoffmann and A.Stetzer (Hoffmann, Stetzer 1998) has pointed 
out that “a necessary prerequisite for accident investigation, might be a context that 
encourages open, positive and free-flowing communication about negative events”. They 
conducted an experiment using two different samples of respondents that were workers of 
a large utility company. The sample 1 in one experimental condition “received clear 
information indicating that a worker was the cause of the accident, they were workers in 
team where open and upward communication regarding safety were not encouraged, and 
they were less willing to make internal attributions. With respect to the second sample, 
whose members received information indicating both internal and external causes, the 
results indicated that workers on teams with a positive safety climate and where 
communication about safety issues was open made more internal attributions.” 
The second feature regards the tendency to draw only superficial conclusion from the 
accident scenario under analysis, and to stick to the first hypothesis that come to our mind, 
this tendency is called mind-set or, with the German term, ‘Einstellung’. 
A reason for this behaviour is the one quoted by Dörner (D. Dörner 1987): 
“Reductive hypotheses are very attractive for the simple reason that they reduce insecurity 
with one stroke and encourage the feeling that things are understood (they can even be 
right- why not, that can be proved. The probability is rather low, however, that organic 
structures are monocausal and radially organized)”  
The only way to avoid the ‘Einstellung’ is to be aware of this natural tendency, and to 
encourage the investigation to go beyond premature conclusions. 
The training of the personnel in charge for the accident investigation can provide sufficient 
awareness. 
There is a last suggestion in the OHSAS 18002 2000 worth noting: 
- “Identified causes of non conformances, accidents and incidents should be classified 
and analysed on a regular basis…. The associated documentation should be appropriate 
to the level of corrective action.” 
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A computerised database is the modern tool for obtaining a useful record-keeping 
instrument. Furthermore it permits to implement a methodical data analysis, which in turn 
can provide Key Performance indicators for this peculiar “managerial activity”. Quoting 
again Dan Petersen we might say that “Safety should be managed like any other company 
function. Management should direct the safety effect by setting achievable goals and by 
planning, organizing, and controlling to achieve them. The key to effective line safety 
performance is management procedures that fixed accountability.” 
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5 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND ROOT 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS. 
 
A safety management system is, according to the definition given by the OHSAS 18001 
(1999): 
“ part of the overall management system that facilitates the management of the 
Occupational Health and Safety risks associated with the business of the 
organization. 
This includes the organizational structure, planning activities, responsibilities, 
practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing, implementing, 
achieving, reviewing and maintaining the organization’s Occupational Health and 
Safety policy”.  
In the present chapter, with the aim of confirming adequate regulatory coverage, the  root 
causes according to the classification derived from accident analysis (see chapter 4) are 
confronted with the main seven points constitutive of a major accident prevention policy 
according the Seveso II Directive, that is to say: 
“(a) the major accident prevention policy should be established in writing and should 
include the operator's overall aims and principles of action with respect to the control 
of major-accident-hazards;  
(b) the safety management system should include the part of the general management 
system which includes the organizational structure, responsibilities, practices, 
procedures, processes and resources for determining and implementing the major-
accident prevention policy;  
(c) the following issues shall be addressed by the safety management system: 
(i) organization and personnel - the roles and responsibilities of personnel involved 
in the management of major hazards at all levels in the organization. The 
identification of training needs of such personnel and the provision of the training so 
identified. The involvement of employees and, where appropriate, subcontractors;  
(ii) identification and evaluation of major hazards - adoption and implementation 
of procedures for systematically identifying major hazards arising from normal and 
abnormal operation and the assessment of their likelihood and severity;  
(iii) operational control - adoption and implementation of procedures and 
instructions for safe operation, including maintenance, of plant, processes, equipment 
and temporary stoppages;  
(iv) management of change - adoption and implementation of procedures for 
planning modifications to, or the design of new installations, processes or storage 
facilities;  
(v) planning for emergencies - adoption and implementation of procedures to 
identify foreseeable emergencies by systematic analysis and to prepare, test and 
review emergency plans to respond to such emergencies;  
(vi) monitoring performance - adoption and implementation of procedures for the 
ongoing assessment of compliance with the objectives set by the operator's major-
accident prevention policy and safety management system, and the mechanisms for 
investigation and taking corrective action in case of non-compliance. The procedures 
should cover the operator's system for reporting major accidents of near misses, 
particularly those involving failure of protective measures, and their investigation 
and follow-up on the basis of lessons learnt;  
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(vii) audit and review - adoption and implementation of procedures for periodic 
systematic assessment of the major-accident prevention policy and the effectiveness 
and suitability of the safety management system; the documented review of 
performance of the policy and safety management system and its updating by senior 
management.” 
The confront can be easily made by the use of a matrix, where each line is one of the seven 
points in above and each column is one of the root causes highlighted in the Drogaris’s 
analysis in the previous chapter: 
 
 (SEVESO II)  
 
Critical features in safety management 
according to Drogaris’ classification  1.1 1.2 1.3
1.4.
1 
1.4.
2 
1.4.
3 
1.4.
4 
1.4.
5 
1.4.
6 
1.4.
7 
1.4.
8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 3 
C.1 Organisation and personnel                                     
C.2 
Identification and evaluation of major 
hazard                                     
C.3 Operational control                                     
C.4 Management of change                                     
C.5 Planning for emergencies                                     
C.6 Monitoring performance                                     
C.7 Audit and review                                     
  
Tab 5.1 Cross Sectional Analysis between the seven points of the Seveso II and Drogaris classification 
Where the numbers in column correspond to: 
Root causes: 
1) Managerial/organizational omissions 
1.1 Lack of a safety culture 
1.2 Inadequate safety organization 
1.3 Pre-determined safety procedures not observed (E.g.: to keep up or to speed up the 
production, etc) 
1.4 Insufficient or unclear procedures 
1.4.1 Operational procedures 
1.4.2 Maintenance procedure 
1.4.3 Testing, commissioning, inspection or calibration related procedures 
1.4.4 Construction procedures 
1.4.5 Internal communication procedures 
1.4.6 Work permit procedures 
1.4.7 Laboratory analysis procedures 
1.4.8 Material storage procedures 
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1.5 Insufficient supervision  
1.6 Failure to clarify causes of previous accidents 
1.7 Insufficient operator training 
1.8 Understaffing 
1.9 Insufficient installation of safeguarding 
2) Design inadequacy 
3) Appropriate procedures not followed (short-cuts) 
The boxes filled with a clearer colour need some clarifications:  
- the problems regarding construction procedures (column 1.4.4) can be considered 
partly in the field of “management of change” partly in “operational control”. Indeed 
the former concerns change for parts that are to be built brand new or to be modified 
while the second covered all the operations, also the construction ones, that are “ for 
safe operation, including maintenance, of plant, processes, equipment and 
temporary stoppages”; 
- “Design inadequacies”(column 4.2) can be managed partly in the field of 
management of change (they regards both old and new plants, or parts of the 
plant), and partly in the field of “identification and evaluation of major hazards”, 
since one of the best ways to  increment safety is “an inherently safe design”; 
- The column 1.9 “ Insufficient installation of safeguarding” belongs to the field of 
Planning for emergencies because  the installation of safeguarding requires a 
systematic analysis of the possible way by which an emergency can be detected 
and the first steps in order to resolve it or to mitigate the consequences. 
- It is important to notice that in the analysis of the critical features of safety 
management according to Drogaris’ classification there was not a specific voice 
dedicated to management of change (which is a cause connected with the one of 
the Flixborough Accident  as well). The accident , in fact, was mainly due to a 
change applied without a proper plan for its design and its consequences: the 
temporary substitution of a reactor with a pipe was at the origin of a relevant 
explosion.  
 
After this analysis, it appears that the regulatory requirements cover control of all root 
causes identified for major accidents, in addition they make more explicit reference to 
important issues such as management of change. 
As the Tokaimura accident demonstrated, it is not enough to rely on self control of 
management systems: it appeared very appropriate to establish routine inspections from 
authority to control the main critical features of safety management. Check lists may be 
useful instruments both for external inspections and self-evaluation as well. Examples of 
possible questions in such check lists are reported below‡: 
• Is safety management supported by the higher levels of the organization? 
• Who is responsible of its implementation? 
• Are the performances or the activities of the company monitored through the use of 
some specific mechanisms for qualitative and quantitative evaluation? 
                                                 
‡
 Other guidelines are available in the documentation of  the Major Accident Hazard Bureau of the European 
Union, MAHB or in the OHSAS 1800/1999 and 1800/2000 of the BSI. 
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• Is Risk analysis and risk assessment carried out by the use of an appropriate 
methodology, such as Hazop or similar methods, that enable to design or to modify 
equipment and procedures with a systematic criterion. 
• Is risk analysis carried out in relation of all the most critical parts and the most 
critical operation of the plant? 
• Is the population around the establishment adequately informed of possible hazards 
and of the consequent emergency plan that regard them? 
• Is the management system documented with the appropriate standards? 
• Does the organization assign  clearly, roles and responsibilities at every level, in 
relation to the required competencies? 
• Does the organization have internal committees for safety? If yes, what are their 
functions? 
• Is the organization able to manage changes so that every change is adequately 
evaluated and integrated with the rest of the operational assess?  
• Does the organization have an internal audit system? Is the audit frequency planned 
in relation to the particular features of the object that has to be checked? 
• Does the organization have a procedure for reporting and investigate past accidents or 
non-conformities? 
• Does the organization have a procedure for the follow up actions in relation to past 
accidents and non conformities? 
The analysis of cause of accidents, SMS regulation requirements and inspection possibilities 
constitutes a valid background for approaching  analysis and improvement of existing 
procedures in an industrial environment, 
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6  HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY FROM 
THE PROCESS INDUSTRY 
Reporting and investigating accidents, incidents and near misses aim at preventing further 
recurrences by identifying weak points and failures in technical equipment and in the 
management system, and by taking appropriate corrective actions. The adoption of a sound 
procedure is one of the main channel by which is possible to implement the “continue 
meliorating cycle” for the management system. 
- Furthermore the OHSA 18002 (2000) suggests “Identified causes of non 
conformances, accidents and incidents should be classified and analysed on a regular 
basis…. The associated documentation should be appropriate to the level of corrective 
action.”  
A computerised database is the modern tool for useful record-keeping. During the stage of the 
author at the Falconara (I) oil refinery, because of the construction of a new database, the 
company organised a review of the procedures for dealing with non conformance and incident 
analysis, and reporting on human and  organizational factors. The author participated in this 
revision by proposing the adoption of a procedure based on the SLIM methodology for 
ameliorating the procedures for remedying to non conformances emerging from the analysis. 
The proposed procedure has been now considered for adoption by the operator of the facility.  
6.1 NON CONFORMITIES AND ACCIDENTS ANALYSIS IN 
AN ITALIAN OIL REFINERY 
The Oil Refinery is characterized by: 
- a  work capacity of 3,9 tons per year 
- electric energy production with IGCC unit of 2.000.000 MW/h per year  
- work force of 400 operators and 1500 contractors 
- oil products store capacity of  1.500.000 m3 
 
The Refinery is endowed with an integrated safety quality and environment management 
system that responds to the regulation requirements as shown in the following matrix 
D. Lgs. 334/99 (SEVESO II)  
 
Feature of the internal safety 
management system I.1
II.
1
III.
1
IV.
1 V.1
VI.
1 
VI.
2 
VII
.1
VII
I.1
IX.
1 
IX.
2 
IX.
3 
IX.
4 
IX.
5 
IX.
6 
IX.
7 
IX.
8 
X.
1
XI.
1
XI.
2
X
.
C.1 Organization and personnel                                        
C.2 
Identification and evaluation of major 
hazards                                        
C.3 Operational control                                        
C.4 Management of change                                        
C.5 Planning of emergencies                                        
C.6 Monitoring performance                                       
C.7 Audit and review                                        
Tab 6.1 Correspondence between the Safety Management System of the Refinery and the 
seven points of the Seveso Directive 
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Where the value in column are: 
In particular:  
The procedure used to analyse and report accident and non-conformances is structured as a 
part of the IX.1 point of the safety management system and it is structured in the following 
steps: 
1) Identification of  all the relevant information about the accident or the non conformance 
2) Event description 
3) Evaluation of the events in terms of real or potential risk (using the matrix in the module A1 
section B reported in the following) 
4) Analysis of the immediate and root causes 
5) Re-examination of the events, evaluating the problems identified 
6) Definition of the follow up actions in order to prevent or to control the root causes that have 
been underlined 
7) Control of the time schedule established for the follow up actions. 
To report  a non conformance is responsibility of all the personnel in the refinery, contractors 
included. The non conformance has to be reported to the foremen of the area where it 
occurred. These collect then the information and order the first actions needed for bringing the 
situation back to  a safe condition. The internal report and the analysis is implemented using 
the modules presented in the following (module A.1 section A, A.1 section B, A.1 section C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I.1 Policy document VII.1 Communication 
 
IX.6 Inspections 
II.1Objective and programs VIII.1 Planning/ Risk management IX.7 Audit and surveillance 
III.1 Organization IX.1 Operative control/Safety and 
Environment 
 
IX.8 Security 
IV.1 Management of the documentation IX.2 Changes control X.1 Emergency plan 
 
V.1 Legal prescriptions IX.3 Work permit procedure XI.1Non conformances management 
and Review 
VI.1 Information and training IX.4 Supply/ contractors XI.2 Internal Audit 
VI.2 Personal protective equipment IX.5 Maintenance  
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6.2 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NON CONFORMANCES 
ANALYSIS AND PRIORITIZATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  
 
The “Non conformances Procedure” is a critical element for the ameliorating cycle of the 
safety management system. At the moment, as key performance indicator for this particular 
aspect,  the system assumes the percentage of corrective actions completed according to the 
time scheduled after identifying the non conformances.   
In the present chapter a strategy is proposed, in order to measure the vulnerability of the 
system to human errors.  
This is possible by introducing a further key performance indicator, that in turn can be used 
also for implementing trend analysis and for establishing a priority scale among the different 
corrective actions. This aspect could be also further developed in order to use this indicator as 
a quantitative term for a Cost-Benefit analysis ( this aspect however, will not be discussed in 
the present report).  
The accident reporting system in the refinery is structured in such a way that for each event the 
analyst should report immediate causes (two macro categories: Operative Practices below the 
standards, Operative conditions below the standards) and root causes. The root cause are 
subdivided into two macro categories as well: 
• Human Factors: 
o Operator’s Physical or Psychical conditions unsuitable for the task  
o Physical or Psychical Fatigue 
o Lack of general knowledge 
o Lack of specific technical knowledge required for the task 
o Insufficient motivation 
o Slip/lapsus 
o Routine violation 
• Job related factors: 
o Incorrect environmental/safety/ health evaluation 
o Design /construction inadequacies 
o Erroneous task planning 
o Inadequacy of materials or components quality 
o Incorrect maintenance by contractors 
o I&T equipment inadequacy 
o Lack of inspections /fatigue of the components/ incorrect use 
o Criticality related to the procedure/Operation as assigned 
 
For the root causes, it has been proposed to modify the analysis format according to a different 
safety management strategy. The latter is based on SLIM, the method of analysis for human 
errors that has been already described at chapter of the present report. The method is based on 
the proceduralized judgment of a group of experts in relation to the event under scrutiny. For 
each event they assign the appropriate Performance Shaping Factors, that is to say those 
factors, or aspects, characterising the environment in which the event has occurred and the 
particular operative context (e.g.: the human machine interface in a control room, the level of 
training required for the task in a complex system, and so on). 
For each one of these factors it is required an estimation of two values: 
iw   that expresses the importance of each factor and 
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ir  that expresses the actual condition in relation to that aspect at the moment in which the 
event occurred. 
The first value is a weight (usually chosen between 0 and 100) for taking into account how 
important is the factor i in relation to the event or the task under analysis (it is normally better 
to start from the most important in order to assess the others in relation to the first). The value 
ir  aims, instead, at giving an indication about the actual condition of the factor i at the specific 
moment of occurrence of the event (e.g.: to give a numerical example for the non conformance 
for the operation is referred to, the training of the operator is very important ( 80=iw ), but at 
the moment the non conformance occurred the operator in charge was a new employee with 
very little experience and very little specific knowledge about his task ( 20=ir ) .  
Then is possible to calculate
 
∑
=
=
N
1i
  SLI iirw  
Where iw is the weighted value ∑= i iii www /   
If SLI<50 corrective actions and a follow up plan are needed in short time. 
In order to implement the method for the root causes related to human errors some 
performance shaping factors have been introduced (some of which were previously considered 
among job related factors). For each one of those, every time a human error has to be reported 
the analyst (or the team of analyst) should assess the iw  (importance ) and ir  (real condition in 
relation to that aspect at the moment in which the event has occurred). Using those values the 
SLI index in relation to each event can be evaluated. 
It is then possible, through the use of this index, to assign a priority to each possible corrective 
action by considering: 
1) Risk index (real or potential according to which one is the highest) referred to the non 
conformance, identified through the use of  the risk matrix reported in the accident 
reporting system modules of the refinery. 
2) SLI index, the lowest the value is, the more attention is required: the non conformance 
analysis find out some critical pint and corrective actions are needed. 
3) In relation to each event among all the possible corrective actions is better to assign 
resources first to the one presenting the highest iw  and lowest ir  and following this 
criteria the resources are assign step by step to the others as well. 
In order to evaluate how effective a corrective action can be, is possible to recalculate the SLI 
index considering how the corrective action would meliorate the iw  and ir  parameters in 
relation to the factor it would affect. On the base of this proceeding, it could be even possible 
to introduce a cost benefit analysis for the more expensive actions.  
Following the prioritization is then necessary to ensure the control of the scheduled time for 
the execution of the follow up plan, with all the corrective actions.  We now report the 
modules for reporting and analysing non conformances, as they should be changed in relation 
to the proposed procedure; the modules are in Italian, but the parts that are relevant for 
illustrating the application of the SLI index have been translated into English. In particular the 
following table refer to the SLI implementation as part of the modules of the accident 
reporting system. It is worth noting that the root causes classification, as far as the human 
related factors are concerned, are following the Reason’s classification scheme, and this 
enables the analyst to highlight more easily the most appropriate corrective actions.  
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HUMAN FACTORS  PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS IMPORTANCE wi REAL CONDITION  ri 
Operator’s Physical or 
Psychical conditions 
unsuitable for the task  (from 0 to 100) (from 0 to 100) 
Physical or Psychical 
Fatigue Training   
Lack of general 
knowledge Communication   
Lack of specific 
technical knowledge 
required for the task Adequacy of Planning/Supervision   
Insufficient motivation 
Adequacy of Procedure /documentation   
Slips/lapsus  
Time available for task execution   
Routine violations 
Adequacy of Human Machine interface   
 
Tab 6.2: Root causes related to human factors: Table for SLI evaluation in modules of the 
refinery  accident reporting system 
  
A1 SECTION A 
Da: Date of the report                   
A: CSA (Sicurezza Ambiente e Qualità, Sistemi Sicurezza, Antincendio e Prevenzione, Sistemi ambientali, Off site, Manutenzione e 
affidabilità, Affidabilità, STF, Produzione, Operazioni IGCC, Ingegneria e Costruzioni. Ingegneria  di Sicurezza, Tec. Prog. contr. ottim. lavor.) 
C.C. : Direttore, Segreteria Altre Funzioni 
ACCIDENT OR INJURY NEAR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTAL  INCONVENIENCE 
OPERATIVE 
INCONVENIENCE 
 Infortunio 
 Esplosione  
 Incendio 
 Crollo o implosione 
 Danno a proprietà aziendali 
 Danno a proprietà esterne 
 Spandimento grave 
 Fuga di gas  
 Emissione non controllata dai 
camini  
 …..……………………… 
 Potenziale I.I. 
 Potenziali danni a salute 
 Potenziali danni all’ambiente 
 Spandimento lieve 
 Limitata fuga di gas 
 Perdita di chemicals 
 Potenziali danni ai processi 
 Fuori servizio temporaneo effluenti. 
gassosi 
 Fuori servizio temp. effluenti liquidi 
 ………………………… 
 Emissioni Atmosferiche Diffuse  
 Emissioni Atmosferiche Convogliate 
 Scarichi idrici  
 Rifiuti  
 Suolo / Sottosuolo 
 Rumore anomalo 
 Odori sgradevoli anomali 
 Reclami esterni 
 Picchi emissione / fumate 
 Scarichi anomali torcia e/o effluenti 
 …………………………….. 
 Perdita di produzione 
 Ritardi preparazione  
 Ritardi nelle spedizioni 
 Fuori specifica prodotti 
 Incremento consumi 
 Fermata impianti 
 Ritardo delle forniture di servizi 
/ lavori 
 Prodotti / servizi non conformi 
 ……………………………. 
 ……………………………. 
Luogo dell’evento Data  Ora 
Real risk low:   C =       P =       R = Real risk medium:  C =       P =        R = Real risk high:  C =        P =        R = 
Ptential consequences C = Potential risk R =   
EVENT DESCRIPTION  
 
 
 
 
 IMMEDIATE CAUSE -  
  
  
  
  
N
um
er
i 
  
FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES 
 
 
  
  
  
Le
tte
re
 
  
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED 
A  
B  
C  
D  
E  
EVENT  More analysis required                      Does not Require more analysis               Has to be riexamined by CSA      
Function to be involved -  
Leader 
Firma (leggibile) di chi ha steso il Rapporto  
TO BE COMPILED BY THE CSA SECRETARY 
Classification  
 
S     A      Q     
Leader  
                                                                                                                                                                       The CSA President 
 
  
 
 
CONSEQUENCES OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY 
A B C D E 
MOLTO RARA RARA OCCASIONALE    PROBABILE FREQUENTE C Parola chiave Economiche Immagine Ambientali 
Salute e 
Sicurezza Probabilità quasi 
nulla Improbabile  
Può accadere 
alcune volte (1) 
Può accadere 
più volte  
 Può accadere 
ripetutamente  
Disagio 
1 MINIMA  
No / o leggera 
influenza sulle 
lavorazioni      
 < 10 K€  
Entro i confini Effetti  ambientali 
entro i confini Medicazioni / Inf. 
da 1 a 3 g 
1 2 3 4 10 (x2) 
Malessere 2 MODERATA Slow down  > 10 < 100 K€  Aree limitrofe 
Picchi di emissione /  
Segnalazioni singole Da 3 a 10 g 
2 4 6 16 30 (x3) 
Malattia Profes. 
Reversibile 3 SERIA Shut down breve  >100 K€ <1M€  
Territorio 
Comunale 
Emissioni 
prolungate / 
Segnalazioni 
Ripetute Da 10 a 30 g 
3 6 18 36 60 (x4) 
Danni alla salute 
permanente 4 MOLTO SERIA 
Shut down 
prolungato  
> 1 < 10 M€  
Provinciale / 
Regionale 
Perdite o rilasci / 
Contaminazione 
reversibile >30g / Infortun. a 
+ persone 
4 16 36 64 80 (x4) 
Esposizioni letali 
5 ESTREMA 
Sostanziale o 
totale perdita di 
operatività 
> 10 M€  
Nazionale 
Perdite o rilasci / 
Contaminazione 
permanente 
Infortunio 
mortale 
10 30 60 80 100 (x5) 
IMMEDIATE CAUSES 
OPERATIVE PRACTICE BELOW THE STANDARD WORK CONDITIONS BELOW THE STANDARD 
1 Eseguita un’operazione che non si voleva / doveva fare / senza 
autorizzazione 19 Sistemi di sicurezza / prevenzione / protezione non adeguati 
2 Dimenticata un' operazione che si doveva / voleva fare 20 Apparecchiature / Attrezzature / Materiali non idoneo all'utilizzo 
3 Mancanza di comunicazione / Segnalazioni errata / insufficiente / non 
alle persone appropriate (es. di un’azione, un pericolo,  allarme) 21 Apparecchiature / Attrezzature non in sicurezza 
4 Mancanza di condizioni di sicurezza errate / insufficienti 22 Rottura e/od usura che poteva essere prevista / imprevista 
5 Mancata Valutazione / Pianificazione errata / insufficiente 23 Sistema di segnalazione / allarme inadeguato / malfunzionanti 
6 Mancanza di precisione / velocità di esecuzione impropria /  fretta 24 Pericoli di incendi / esplosioni 
7 Uso non corretto / improprio di attrezzature / apparecchiature 25 Congestione dell’area / Possibilità di azione limitata 
8 Uso di attrezzature / apparecchiature malfunzionanti 26 Pulizia e ordine carente / Presenza di ostacoli 
9 DPI non utilizzati / usati male / difettosi 27 Presenza di polveri, fumi, nebbie, gas o vapori 
10 Conoscenza inadeguata di regole e procedure 28 Ventilazione inadeguata 
11 Procedura non seguita / Disposizione impropria 29 Esposizione ad alte o basse temperature 
12 Resi non operativi i sistemi di sicurezza / controllo 30 Illuminazione inadeguata o eccessiva 
13 Appar./ strutture/ macchine posizionate/ caricate in modo inadeguato 31 Rumore eccessivo / esposizione eccessiva 
14 Impropria operazione di carico / sollevamento / ripristino / sostituzione di apparecchiature / strutture/ macchine 32 Transito pericoloso / Mezzi di trasporto 
15 Posizione o postura  impropria per l’attività svolta 33 Segnaletica carente 
16 Manutenzione / Intervento su apparecchiatura in funzione 34 Procedura mancante od inadeguata 
17 Disattenzione / Comportamento non adeguato 35 Esposizione a radiazioni 
18 Altro: 36 Altro: 
ROOT  CAUSES 
HUMAN FACTORS 
A 
Operator’s Physical or 
Psychical conditions 
unsuitable for the task 
 PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS IMPORTANCE wi REAL CONDITION  ri 
B Physical or Psychical Fatigue Training (from 0 to 100) (from 0 to 100) 
C Lack of general knowledge Communication   
D 
Lack of specific technical 
knowledge required for the 
task 
Adequacy of Planning/Supervision  
  
E Insufficient motivation Adequacy of Procedure /documentation    
F Slips/lapsus  Time available for task execution   
G Routine violations Adequacy of Human Machine interface    
JOB RELATED FACTORS IMPORTANCE wi REAL CONDITION  ri 
H (from 0 to 100) (from 0 to 100) (da 0 a 100) 
I Design /construction inadequacies   
L Erroneous task planning   
M Inadequacy of materials or components quality   
N Incorrect maintenance executed by contractors   
O I&T equipment inadequacy   
P Lack of inspections /fatigue of the components/ incorrect use   
Q Criticality related to the procedure/Operation as assigned   
  
 
A1 SECTION C  
 
RIEXAM OF THE EVENT FROM  THE EXPERT TEAM 
 
Area of the Event Department Date of the event 
Leader of the accident investigation Classification Date of the report 
Rischio Reale Basso :   C =       P =       R 
= 
Rischio Reale Medio:  C =       P =        R 
= 
Rischio Reale Alto:  C =        P =        R = 
Potential Consequence of the event C = Potential Risk R =   
EVENT DESCRIPTION: FURTHER FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMMEDIATE CAUSES: FURTHER FOUNDINGS 
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SLI INDEX OF THE EVENT        SLI= 
LESSON LEARNT –  
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6.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF A DATABASE FOR NON 
CONFORMANCES ANALYSIS 
 
In order to analyse the events and to keep an historical records of all the events in the 
refinery, a Database has been implemented. The three functions of the database are: 
- Reporting the Non Conformances (data entry), using as a model the format A1.C 
illustrated above.  
- Searching among the Non Conformances using as a criterion Risk index, place 
of the event, fundamental or immediate causes, functions involved, corrective 
actions etc.. 
- Reporting Statistics regarding risk index, causes(among which human and 
organizational related causes), type of events (Incident, Near messed, Operative 
or Environmental Inconvenient), Corrective actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The database represents a valid aid for the identification of critical areas, recurrent type 
of events, recurrent causes in the refinery. It enables the analyst to develop a trend 
analysis for evaluating the effectiveness of  follow up plans on risk index. In the same 
way it is possible to evaluate the performance of the organization in respects of the 
human factors using the index proposed and recording the data in the database. Thus in 
turn it can lead to implement a cross sectional analysis in order to identify possible 
concurrent causes of human factors problems.  
In the following pages are reported some of the possible results of the data analysis 
implemented using the database; the real values are not showed in the figures for 
protection of the industrial secret of the company they refer to. 
The following figure (Fig 6.3) shows the number of Non Conformances reported during 
the years in the refinery. The Non Conformances have been distinguished in NA (Near 
Accident), II (Incident or Injury), IO (Operative inconvenience), IA (environmental 
Inconvenience). The last classification category has been introduced only in 1998 this is 
Fig 6.1 First dialog box of the user 
interface of the database menu:  
Fig 6.2  dialog box of the database: the menu of 
the possible causes human factors and  factors 
related to job conditions 
  
 
the reason why it does not appear before then(yellow curve). The velvet curve on top of 
the other represent the total amount of Non Conformances reported. The curve has a 
positive trend during the last part, this can be due to two different causes, the most 
immediate to underline is the fact that more accident happen in the refinery, which is a 
negative sign, on the other hand it is possible to say that the safety culture of the 
company has been improved, and as a result more Non Conformances are reported 
considering that during the previous years some of the events were not reported at all. In 
favor of this hypothesis is the number of events collected under the category IO 
(Operative Inconvenience) and IA (Environment Inconvenience) which did not exist 
before and therefore were possibly not taken into account in the previous years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following figures illustrates the fundamental causes identified for the event 
reported during the years. The blue curve represents the event for which the main 
fundamental causes are human related factors, the pink curve are the ones for which 
the causes were mainly job related factors; while the yellow curve represents the 
amount of events for which the causes have not been clearly identified 
(e.g.incomplete reports). 
 
 
NON CONFORMANCES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
NA
II
IO
IA
TOT NC
FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Fattori Umani Fattori legati al lavoro
non individuate
Fig 6.3 Number of the various categories of non conformances reported during the 
years in the refinery. The higher velvet curve is the cumulative 
Fig 6.4 Fundamental causes reported during the years: Human related Factors(blue curve) , 
Job related factors (pink curve), Not identified(yellow curve)
  
 
Using the database it is possible to built diagrams able to show for each human related 
factors the percentage contribution to the event occurred during each year. An example 
is showed in the following figure (Fig 6.5). This in turn enables to highlight possible 
critical area of intervention in order to prevent human errors. Furthermore for each 
human related factors identified as critical (in the example reported for year 2002 the 
most recurrent errors were slips/lapsus), it is possible to find out which performance 
shaping factors are more strictly connected, and therefore direct towards them a 
medium/long term  preventive/ mitigation plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The method proposed will not change completely the current procedure in the oil 
refinery. It can be introduced as a possible addition to the present one. It is important to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the new method of analysis to all the foremen and the 
operation directors that are going to be members of the group of analysis of reportable 
event in the refinery.  
This can be done by examining 100 cases of previous accidents due to human factors, 
and performing a trend analysis using the values of SLI calculated in this way.  
The proposal is aimed at reaching a better understanding of the various forms of danger 
that can be present in a complex system as an oil refinery, and therefore at constructing 
a base of evaluation for the operative methods used to keep safety.  
A very important step to improve the meliorating cycle of a safety management system, 
is a cultural orientation of the members in the organization, aimed at finding remedies 
for preventing major accident, and not culprits to accuse. Being conscious of the defects 
that every human system, even the most “perfect”, can present. 
 
 
 
HUMAN FACTORS 20020%
3%
0%
6%
19%
6%
47%
19%
Non idoneità fisica e / o
psicologica  A
Affaticamento fisico e / o
psicologico B
Mancanza di conoscenza
generale C
Mancanza conoscenza
tecnica specifica D
Motivazione insufficiente E
Sviste e lapsus R
Abitudini errate S
Fig 6.5 Human factors  identified as major contribution for the accident occurred during 
the year 2002 in the refinery 
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